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•  The SYRIZA-led coalition government attempted to perform a 180-degree turn from the rather 
restrictive migration and asylum policies of the previous governments.
•  Very few of the SYRIZA/ANEL coalition government’s pledges actually materialised. The 
long-promised policy shift was rather designed to fail as it was largely symbolic and paid no 
consideration to the broader context and changing policy dynamics.
•  The closure of the ‘Western Balkan route’ and the activation of the EU-Turkey Statement in 
March 2016 interrupted the government’s attempted U-turn.
•  In order to make the EU-Turkey Statement operable in the country, the government introduced 
laws that tightened Greece’s asylum, detention, deportation, and external border controls 
policies anew.
•  These very laws also brought to the fore the issue of refugee integration into the Greek society. 
Designing and delivering measures for the integration of international protection beneficiaries 
and applicants appears to be particularly challenging in the current state of play.
•  Three pressing issues will have to be addressed sooner or later in 2017 by the Greek State: 
improvement of first reception and accommodation conditions; acceleration of the examination 
of the international protection, relocation, and family reunification applications; integration 
of international protection beneficiaries and applicants in the labour market. 
•  The extent to which these issues will be effectively addressed depends on the ability of the 
Greek government and the EU to surpass certain well-known structural obstacles. 
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1. Migration and asylum policies 
before 2015
In order to fully comprehend the SYRI-
ZA-led coalition government’s response to 
the migration challenge we must first put 
it in a broader context, which traces the 
evolution of Greek migration and asylum 
policies back in time.
The Greek state’s response to the migration 
challenge in the 1990s and 2000s was char-
acterised by unpreparedness, inconsisten-
cies and short-termism. Migration to Greece 
was reflexively understood and governed 
in security terms (Karyotis 2012). This re-
sponse quickly created a stock of irregular 
migrants, who were, however, largely ab-
sorbed in the informal labour market. In the 
absence of an effective integration policy 
with a long-term view, the Greek state opt-
ed for a series of regularisation programmes 
that ran from 1998 to 2007/2008, and 
granted amnesty to thousands of long-term 
migrants. Overall, Greek migration policy in 
the 1990s and 2000s was predominantly re-
active rather than proactive (Triandafyllidou 
2014). A positive step was taken in March 
2010 when the Greek Parliament adopted 
Law 3838/2010 on citizenship and naturali-
sation. Although hampered by bureaucratic 
insufficiency and complexity, the new law 
demonstrated a vision for migrant integra-
tion and was deemed progressive. Another 
positive step was taken in January 2011, 
when the Greek Parliament adopted Law 
3907/2011. The new law was an attempt to 
revamp the asylum procedure in the coun-
try by establishing separate Asylum and 
First Reception Services, independent from 
the police. 
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1.  Eventually, in November 2012 Law 3838/2010 was found unconstitutional by the State Council.
These few hesitant positive steps were in-
terrupted by the rise of the far-right in the 
country in 2012. Amid growing anti-immi-
grant attitudes in the Greek society, the 
New Democracy-led coalition government 
introduced a bill which returned the citi-
zenship law to its previous conservative 
state.1 Moreover, it introduced Operations 
Aspida (Shield) and Xenios Zeus at the 
Greek-Turkish land border and in mainland 
Greece respectively in an orchestrated at-
tempt to combat both irregular entry and 
stay of third-country nationals. Additionally, 
in October 2012, the government extended 
the detention period of migrants and asylum 
seekers by up to twelve months (i.e. 18 
months in total). Finally, in December 2012, 
the construction of a 12.5km-long barbed 
wire fence was completed at the Greek-Turk-
ish land border.
It is within this context of reviving restric-
tive migration and asylum policies and ris-
ing far-right and anti-immigrant attitudes, 
that the SYRIZA-led coalition government 
came to respond to the 2015-2016 migra-
tion challenge.
2. The response to the 2015-2016 
migration challenge
The SYRIZA-led coalition government that 
was formed after the January 2015 elections 
attempted to make a U-turn on the migra-
tion and asylum policies of the previous gov-
ernment, amid an unprecedented increase 
in migration flows at the Greek-Turkish 
sea border and an unfolding humanitari-
an emergency on the islands (see Crawley 
et al 2016). The opening of the ‘Western 
Balkan route’ in September 2015 relieved 
some of the tensions on the Greek islands 
and bought the government some time to 
complete its policy shift. However, the shift 
was eventually interrupted by the closure 
of the ‘Western Balkan route’ and the acti-
vation of the EU-Turkey Statement, which 
aimed to contain the flows. In this regard, 
the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016 
constitutes a clear cut in the SYRIZA/ANEL 
coalition government’s attempted U-turn.
2.1. Migration and asylum policies 
before the EU-Turkey Statement 
During its election campaign in the end of 
2014 and early 2015, SYRIZA pledged to ex-
pedite the asylum application process; stop 
the use of systematic and indiscriminate 
detention; close down the detention cen-
tres and replace them with open hospitality 
centres; stop push-backs at the borders; 
encourage family reunification; abolish EU 
restrictions on the travel of migrants; re-
move the fence from the Greek-Turkish land 
border; grant citizenship to second-gener-
ation migrants; and strengthen the protec-
tion of human rights in general (Katsiafi-
cas 2015). In addition, it also pledged to 
pursue the revision of Dublin Regulation in 
order to secure a more equal distribution 
of asylum seekers and refugees across EU 
member-states. 
Of course, very few of these pledges actu-
ally materialised. In fact, the long-promised 
policy shift was designed to fail as it was 
largely symbolic and paid no consideration 
to the rapidly increasing flows, the unfold-
ing humanitarian emergency on the Greek 
islands, and the increasing pressures and 
tensions in other EU member-states.
The newly-elected coalition government 
tried to leave its mark in the migrant de-
tention and deportation policy quite early. In 
February 2015, the government proclaimed 
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the closure of migrant detention centres and 
their conversion into open hospitality cen-
tres. In the following four weeks, thousands 
of asylum seekers, mainly vulnerable groups 
who had been detained for more than six 
months, were gradually released. They were 
transported by coaches from detention cen-
tres to downtown Athens, and were given 
the addresses for various NGOs and volun-
teer groups in order to fend for themselves 
(Skleparis and Armakolas 2016). Yet, it was 
only several months later, in August 2015, 
when the first open hospitality centre in 
Elaionas, Athens, welcomed its first guests. 
In the same manner, in March 2015, the 
SYRIZA/ANEL coalition government reacti-
vated Law 3709/11, according to which all 
refugees would be hosted in open hospi-
tality centres, while migrants and rejected 
asylum seekers would be given 30 days, 
without being detained, to voluntarily return 
to their home countries. Only after the ex-
piry of the 30-day deadline, migrants and 
rejected asylum seekers would be deported 
to their countries of origin. However, in cas-
es where deportation was not possible over 
that period (i.e. the vast majority of cases), 
migrants and rejected asylum seekers would 
be given a 6-month temporary residence 
permit with no right to work and no social 
welfare provisions.
The government also attempted to change 
Greece’s internal and external border con-
trols policies. In February 2015, the then 
Alternate Minister for Migration Policy stat-
ed that Operation Xenios Zeus belonged to 
the past. Similarly, Operation Aspida was 
also discontinued, allegedly, due to lack of 
funds and the significantly reduced migra-
tion flows at the Greek-Turkish land border 
(Bolani, Gemi and Skleparis 2016). Along 
the same lines, the fence in the same area, 
which suffered major damage from floods 
during the winter of 2014-2015, was left 
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unrepaired, allegedly, due to lack of funds. 
Additionally, in early July 2015, the former 
Alternate Minister for Migration Policy added 
a last-minute modification to the proposed 
Citizenship Bill, which had been submitted 
for ratification to the Greek Parliament. The 
modification provided for the abolishment of 
anti-smuggling penalties in cases of trans-
portation of third-country nationals in need 
of international protection or within the 
context of a sea rescue. This modification 
legalised smuggling, under the coverage of 
a so-called transportation for humanitarian 
purposes within Greece.
Finally, the SYRIZA/ANEL coalition govern-
ment managed to stick to its commitment 
to put forward the issue of naturalisation of 
second-generation migrants born and raised 
in Greece. Law 4332/2015, which was rati-
fied by the Greek parliament on 9 July 2015, 
amended the Greek Citizenship Code (Law 
4521/2014), and enabled migrant children 
born and raised in Greece to get the Greek 
citizenship.
In sum, the SYRIZA/ANEL coalition govern-
ment did little to actually address the rapidly 
increasing flows of migrants and refugees. 
Instead, it embarked on a long-promised 
migration and asylum policy U-turn, which 
was designed to fail as it was largely sym-
bolic and paid no consideration to the broad-
er context and changing policy dynamics.
2.2. Migration and asylum policies 
after the EU-Turkey Statement
The closure of the ‘Western Balkan route’ 
and the activation of the EU-Turkey State-
ment in March 2016 had a twofold effect on 
the policies of the SYRIZA/ANEL coalition 
government. On the one hand, they trig-
gered the tightening of asylum, detention, 
deportation, and external border controls 
policies. On the other hand, they set in mo-
tion policies that brought to the fore the 
issue of refugee integration into the Greek 
society.
Greek asylum law was amended in April 2016 
to make the EU-Turkey Statement operable 
in the country. The new law (4375/2016) 
established an exceptional asylum regime 
on the Greek islands and other border areas. 
Displaced people in the country currently 
adhere to one of two different international 
protection procedures depending on wheth-
er they arrived before or after the activation 
of the EU-Turkey Statement. Those who ar-
rived in Greece before 20 March 2016 fall 
under the ‘normal’ international protection 
procedure, and were transferred from the 
islands to various accommodation facilities 
across the Greek mainland with other dis-
placed people when the Statement came 
into effect. 
On the other hand, those who arrived in 
Greece after the activation of the state-
ment fall under the exceptional fast-track 
procedures of the new asylum law. Only 
vulnerable groups are exempt from these 
procedures. According to the new law, all 
international protection applications are 
deemed ‘admissible’ or ‘inadmissible’ based 
on the applicants’ interviews with European 
Asylum Support Office (EASO) and Greek 
Asylum Service personnel. The Greek au-
thorities’ decision determines whether Tur-
key can be considered a safe country for the 
applicants on a case-by-case basis. Those 
applicants deemed admissible have to stay 
on the islands until their application proce-
dure is completed in Athens. Those deemed 
inadmissible are given the right to appeal. If 
the appeal is rejected they are deported to 
Turkey. However, the same law (4375/2016) 
also reintroduced the issue of refugee inte-
gration into the Greek society. All interna-
tional protection beneficiaries and applicants 
were given access to wage employment or 
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self-employment on the same terms and 
conditions with Greek nationals, provided 
that they have a valid residence permit. An-
other new law (4368/2016) entitled inter-
national protection beneficiaries and appli-
cants to free access to pharmaceuticals and 
healthcare in medical centres and hospitals, 
and to social security and welfare services. 
All international protection beneficiaries and 
applicants are now eligible for various social 
benefits, such as unemployment allowances 
etc., provided that they have at least one 
year of work experience with social security 
which is only very rarely the case. Finally, 
yet another new law (4415/2016) allowed 
for the organisation of reception classes for 
refugee children in Greek public schools. 
Children aged between 6 and 15 years old 
are now able to enrol in afternoon classes 
from 14:00 to 18:00 in local public schools. 
All refugee children have the right to access 
school education provided that they are vac-
cinated. It should be noted, however, that all 
these provisions exclude those who remain 
on the islands.
3. The current state of play
Yet, the view from the ground is different 
from that at the policy level. The new asylum 
law has created new international protection 
implications and concerns, and has divided 
international protection beneficiaries and 
applicants that entered Greece from 2015 
onwards in two sub-populations depending 
on their date of arrival in the country. Each 
of these sub-populations faces a different 
reality and different needs.
Only in 2016, the Greek Asylum Service 
registered 51,000 international protection 
applications (Asylum Service 2017). This 
has overstretched its capacity to process in-
ternational protection applications, which in 
combination with its understaffing and sev-
eral other ongoing deficiencies hinder access 
to international protection both for those 
who arrived before and after the activation 
of the EU-Turkey Statement (Actionaid et al. 
2016). The assessment of international pro-
tection applications by the Greek authorities 
based on nationality rather than arrival date 
and vulnerability constitutes another ma-
jor issue of concern. In practice this means 
that applications by certain nationalities, like 
the Syrians, are given priority as they are 
deemed ‘easier’ to deal with (see Triandafyl-
lidou 2017). Moreover, the family reunifi-
cation process can take up to one year to 
be completed and it is quite complicated.2 
Consequently, a large number of refugees 
in Greece have significant family members 
in other countries of the EU, which they are 
not able to reach (Actionaid et al. 2016). In 
addition, the relocation process is painful-
ly slow, while some EU member-states are 
reluctant to participate in the mechanism.3 
More than 1.5 years after the proposal of 
the measure only 15% (9,610) of the total 
number of 63,302 relocation places from 
Greece have been filled, leaving thousands 
in limbo in the country (European Commis-
sion 2017).
Greece currently hosts approximately 
63,000 international protection beneficia-
ries and applicants that entered the coun-
try from 2015 onwards (UNHCR 2017). Ap-
proximately 49,000 of them are hosted in 
the mainland, either in official and informal 
2. Family reunification is available to people who are already granted refugee status in Greece and have a core member of 
their family in another EU member-state.
3. In May 2015, in response to the increasing numbers of asylum seekers arriving in the EU, the European Commission 
proposed the establishment of an emergency relocation scheme, whereby people in need of international protection and 
already in the EU could be distributed between EU member-states in a fair and balanced way.
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camps run by the state, NGOs and volun-
teers, or in apartments and hotels run by 
municipal authorities and NGOs. Those liv-
ing in camps are currently in need of health 
care, education, services for survivors of 
gender-based violence, and mental health 
and psychosocial support services (Actionaid 
et al. 2016). Some access to the aforemen-
tioned services is available, but the quality 
varies greatly across camps. Food security 
and accommodation conditions also need 
to be improved for many of those living in 
the camps.
Such concerns are heightened particularly for 
those living on the Greek islands. Approxi-
mately 14,000 people are hosted in reception 
and identification centres (formerly known 
as ‘hotspots’) on the islands (UNHCR 2017). 
The nominal capacity of these facilities ranges 
around 9,000 places, which entails that they 
currently operate way beyond their maximum 
capacity. This has resulted in overcrowded 
and substandard conditions for hosted popu-
lations. Poor food and accommodation quality 
pushes international protection applicants to 
resort to harmful survival mechanisms and 
fuel existing frustration and tension in the 
camps, or between host and refugee com-
munities (Actionaid et al. 2016). Safety and 
protection in the camps are also issues of in-
creasing concern. Several incidents of violence 
and suicide attempts have been recorded in 
camps across the islands (Al Jazeera 2017). 
Harsh living conditions, combined with dis-
criminatory policies and the fear of potential 
return to Turkey, have led to various instances 
of violent protests and riots (Euronews 2016). 
In turn, such incidents fuel frustration among 
host communities and feed far-right move-
ments providing a justification of the use of 
violence against third-country nationals (Al 
Jazeera 2016).
Those who live on the islands are excluded 
from labour market and social welfare provi-
sions. On the other hand, due to high unem-
ployment, international protection beneficia-
ries and applicants residing in the mainland 
face very limited access to labour market and 
social welfare services, despite the fact that 
they are included in such provisions. Sub-
sequently, they rely on food, non-food item 
and financial assistance distributions to meet 
their basic needs. In the last seven years, 
with the onset of the financial crisis and 
austerity measures, the construction, agri-
culture and retail sectors, which traditional-
ly absorbed third-country nationals, began 
to contract (European Commission 2016). 
Employment opportunities and income have 
shrunk for both natives and third-country 
nationals, resulting in lower wages and pre-
carious terms of employment. Henceforth, 
employment prospects for newcomers are 
rather bleak, as the Greek economy keeps 
shrinking and unemployment rates rise. At 
the same time, cuts in the health sector and 
subsequent deterioration of the quality of 
provided health services have led various 
NGOs, volunteers and some municipal au-
thorities to provide basic health, social secu-
rity and welfare services to international pro-
tection beneficiaries and applicants. In addi-
tion, state funding for language and voca-
tional training courses, intercultural schools 
and immigrant civil society organisations has 
shrunk since the onset of the crisis (Euro-
pean Commission 2016). This gap has been 
only partly filled by civil society actors and 
organisations. These shortcomings diminish 
social integration prospects for international 
protection beneficiaries and applicants in the 
mainland.
4. The road ahead
Greece has come to terms with the fact 
that few thousand refugees and migrants 
will remain in the country. There are three 
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pressing issues that the Greek state will 
have to address sooner or later in 2017: 
first, the improvement of first reception and 
accommodation conditions for international 
protection beneficiaries and applicants on 
the islands and in the mainland. The second 
priority refers to the need to accelerate the 
examination of the international protection, 
relocation, and family reunification applica-
tions of those who live in the mainland, and 
the international protection applications of 
those who reside on the islands. The third 
priority relates to the need to help interna-
tional protection beneficiaries and applicants 
who live in the mainland to gradually move 
away from humanitarian aid-dependence to 
self-reliance, or else, to integrate them in 
the labour market. 
However, the extent to which these issues 
will be effectively addressed depends on the 
ability of the Greek government and the EU 
to surpass certain well-known structural ob-
stacles: Greece’s public budget constraints, 
bureaucratic deficiencies, understaffing 
of key public services, and the contract-
ing economy, as well as the reluctance of 
other EU member-states to share the re-
sponsibility of receiving and accommodat-
ing international protection beneficiaries 
and applicants. Considering the gravity of 
these obstacles, there is a high risk that 
these pressing issues will not be efficiently 
addressed, which will have a detrimental 
impact on the lives of those in need of pro-
tection. What is more, it is possible that 
the resulting deteriorating situation will be 
operationalised by the Greek government 
to deter future arrivals on the Greek islands 
and the reinstatement of returns to Greece 
under the Dublin regulation. If these worst-
case scenarios came true, they would cer-
tainly increase suffering among the most 
vulnerable and would constitute serious 
breaches of the country’s obligations.
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